My Thesis on Family Estrangement

Draft:

People who experience estrangement frequently report feeling morally judged by others, as though they have violated a social taboo by severing or being severed from family ties. Such judgments may be articulated in explicitly religious terms, but they also appear in broader social and cultural forms. Religious critiques often invoke biblical injunctions such as the commandment to “honour thy father and mother,” while social arguments sometimes minimize harm by appealing to generational comparison (e.g., “it wasn’t abuse in my day”), thereby implying that past lack of recognition justifies or mitigates harmful behaviour. Moral objections are also framed in consequentialist terms, as in the claim, “you wouldn’t like it if your child cut you off,” which suggests that widespread estrangement would erode the fabric of society by undermining essential family bonds.

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In exploring these arguments, it is necessary to distinguish between religious doctrine, culturally dominant ideologies (such as patriarchy, racial hierarchies, or political systems), and broader conceptions of morality. While morality has been a subject of extensive philosophical debate, a comprehensive review is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, this analysis will focus on several enduring frameworks, including those of Kant, Kohlberg, and Gilligan.

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Kantian philosophy is vast and multifaceted, but the principle most relevant here is the notion of universal law: a moral action is one that could be willed as a universal maxim. Put more simply, this framework asks whether, if everyone acted in a given way, human suffering would be reduced or exacerbated overall.

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When estranged individuals are told, “you wouldn’t like it if your child cut you off,” or “if everyone abandoned family ties, society would fall apart,” such critiques reflect a Kantian mode of reasoning. The categorical imperative asks whether an action could be willed as a universal law without contradiction or undue harm. Within this framework, estrangement is often framed as inherently immoral, since its universalization is imagined to destabilize social cohesion. However, estrangers’ lived accounts complicate this interpretation. Rather than acting out of disregard for duty, many describe estrangement as a last resort following years of harm, undertaken precisely to minimize suffering. A Kantian analysis, then, need not automatically condemn estrangement: if universalizing the refusal to tolerate abuse or neglect would lead to a reduction in overall harm, estrangement could arguably be consistent with the principle of universal law.

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Kohlberg’s theory of moral development, though primarily psychological rather than philosophical, provides further insight. His stage-based model (Kohlberg, 1981) emphasizes how individuals reason about moral dilemmas, moving from obedience to authority, through conformity to social norms, toward higher levels of reasoning based on principles of justice. Judgments around estrangement—such as appeals to obedience (“honour your parents”) or social conformity (“everyone else maintains contact”)—can be understood as reflecting earlier stages of moral reasoning, where authority and convention outweigh individual wellbeing.

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Common judgments of estranged people—such as “you must honour your parents” or “everyone else stays in contact”—can also be read through Kohlberg’s stages of moral development. These arguments often draw upon what Kohlberg described as “conventional” levels of moral reasoning, in which obedience to authority and conformity to social norms are treated as moral goods in themselves. Yet estrangers’ narratives often reveal a progression toward higher-stage reasoning, where decisions are based on principles of justice and the weighing of harm. From this perspective, the choice to estrange may be understood as a shift from conformity-based morality to principle-based morality, where individual wellbeing is valued over unquestioned obedience to family authority.

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Gilligan (1982), critiquing Kohlberg, proposed an ethic of care as an alternative lens. Rather than situating morality solely in abstract principles of justice, Gilligan emphasizes attentiveness to relationships, responsibility, and the avoidance of harm. From this perspective, estrangement may be interpreted not as a moral failing, but as a deeply relational act of care for the self, and sometimes even for others, by refusing to perpetuate cycles of abuse or neglect.

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Gilligan’s ethic of care offers a further reframing. Rather than evaluating morality solely through justice or duty, Gilligan highlights relational responsibility and the avoidance of harm. Through this lens, estrangement can be interpreted not as selfishness but as an act of care—often care for the self, but sometimes also for children, partners, or even the wider family system, by breaking cycles of abuse or dysfunction. Many estrangers describe their decision as a painful but protective one, undertaken to safeguard wellbeing where reconciliation proved impossible. In this sense, estrangement may exemplify a caring moral response, even when it violates dominant cultural scripts of unconditional family loyalty.

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Taken together, these frameworks reveal how judgments of estrangement often rest on narrow or conventional understandings of morality. Kantian reasoning is frequently invoked in everyday critiques, yet a fuller application suggests estrangement may reduce, rather than increase, overall harm. Kohlberg’s model highlights how many condemnations rely on conformity to authority or tradition, whereas estrangers’ own reasoning often reflects principle-based moral deliberation. Gilligan’s ethic of care reframes estrangement as a relationally attentive act, oriented toward the protection of self and others. Considering these perspectives side by side suggests that estrangement is not necessarily a violation of morality, but may in fact represent a morally defensible—at times even ethically imperative—response to family harm.

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